
Andrey Ochepovsky, Senior Public Affairs Manager, Kaspersky
Digitalization has become an indispensable part of all spheres of our lives. While this process opens upnew opportunities for development, it is also directly related to growing threats in cyberspace – especially those affecting critical infrastructure, which enable the proper functioning of any country.
Unsurprisingly, an increasing number of governments around the world are introducing or have already implemented regulations that require organizations in specific sectors (mostly those that form part of national critical infrastructure) to report cybersecurity incidents. In most cases, authorities focus on incidents in information systems. However, some regulations (such as the Cyber Resilience Act in the European Union) also require manufacturers to report vulnerabilities in their digital products.
An analysis of the existing incident reporting landscape shows a high level of heterogeneity. The obligations vary significantly across jurisdictions in terms of the categorization of reportable incidents (different definitions of “significant”), deadlines ("without delay"/6 hours/24 hours, etc.), as well as territorial coverage (all incidents or only those relevant to the jurisdiction).
On the one hand, there is no doubt that cybersecurity incident reporting must be considered a matter ofnational security. Therefore, competent authorities have every right to retain their freedom and sovereignty when establishing rules and principles for their jurisdictions and tailoring regulations to national priorities.
On the other hand, the growing heterogeneity of the global cybersecurity incident reporting landscape brings numerous drawbacks – especially for companies operating internationally. This, in turn, can have a negative impact on both global and national digital and economic development.
Specifically, potential drawbacks include:
- Legal uncertainty: Key concepts (including reportable incidents and deadlines) are usually defined differently and sometimes very broadly across various jurisdictions.
- Excessive reporting: The obligation to report every incident, regardless of its severity, increases the burden on organizations and restricts the operational capabilities of regulatory authorities, which would have to process huge amounts of data.
- Slower incident response: Security teams may divert resources toward regulatory reporting instead of technical containment during the critical early hours of an incident.
- Lack of uniformity in imposing incident reporting obligations: Attempts to impose incident reporting obligations on cybersecurity vendors rather than affected entities within some jurisdictions limit the effectiveness of this process, since service providers generally lack visibility into their customers’ infrastructure. Consequently, vendors cannot confirm whether an alarm relates to a real incident or a system check, nor can they assess the severity of incidents.
- Increased compliance burden: The need to comply simultaneously with different incident reporting requirements and report to several authorities significantly increases legal and administrative costs.
- Excessive data retention requirements: Obligations to store incident-related data for a period that exceeds reasonable operational purposes place a significant data security burden on cybersecurity service providers and increase the risk of a potential breach affecting cross-border digital safety.
- Weaker threat awareness: Requirements to preserve all incident-related data, even anonymized and aggregated data, within a country’s borders, or to obtain prior approval from a national authority before sharing cybersecurity information with third parties, reduce the volume of available protective intelligence and lower the global visibility of emerging threats.
Taking all the above into account, increasing “interoperability” between national regulations on incident reporting could be considered an option. Specifically, greater harmonization of incident taxonomies (most notably, the definition of a “severe/significant” incident), as well as a more risk-based, tiered approach to the level of detail required and the reporting timelines, could be prioritized in this area. Such an approach would preserve national regulatory autonomy while reducing unnecessary complexity for organizations operating across borders.
Additionally, it would be advisable to agree on a single reporting entity for each incident, with the directly affected organization designated as the responsible reporting entity. This would streamline the process by eliminating duplicative reporting and clarifying accountability.
One could also draw on global experience in the field of personal data incident notifications.
Competent regulators retain their sovereignty in developing rules and norms within their jurisdictions (including defining “personal data”). However, reporting deadlines are becoming increasingly aligned across jurisdictions. A 72-hour reporting window is emerging as the most widely adopted standard, while requirements to report incidents "without undue delay" appear to be the second most common approach.
There is no doubt that the alignment of incident reporting rules should be the subject of a global dialogue, including throughleading global platforms like the International Telecommunication Union and other UN bodies. Such a dialogue needs to include all interested and affected stakeholders, including government regulators, IT and cybersecurity vendors, international organizations and associations.